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GIDEON'S MUTED TRUMPET
VIcToRIA NOURSE*

Once the darling of the legal academy, criminal procedure has
fallen into disrepute. Thirty-five years ago, when Gideon' was decided,
criminal procedure was the flagship of constitutional law, criminal defense attorneys were heros, and courts and lawyers were perceived as
themselves agents of social justice. Today, there are still heros. But
the conventional wisdom, within the academy and the country at
large, no longer associates criminal law or procedure with heroism.
Indeed, in some quarters, criminal procedure has become the enemy.
Increasingly, scholars urge revisionism, 2 popular pundits brand procedural innovations as a loss of "common sense,"' and philosophers
4
warn that the "procedural republic" has helped us to lose our way.
Striking is this scholarly skepticism when compared to the disturbing fate of those who spawned this conference: they are vulnerable, poor, friendless; they have never seen a lawyer and they have
talked to a judge speaking from a remote televised location. They sit
in jail for ten or twenty or thirty days,5 losing theirjobs and their families, only to have the charges ultimately dismissed.6 Douglas Colbert's
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin. BA., Stanford University; J.D., University of California, Boalt Hall. Thanks very much to Doug Colbert for inviting me to consider this question and to Abby Ross and the editors of the Maryland Law Review for their
help in preparing this essay for publication. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (recognizing that an accused's
right to counsel is one of the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice").
2. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)Demise of Criminal
ProcedureLiberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281 (1998) (book review) (providing an overview and
noting the dangers of one scholar's proposal for criminal procedure reform).
3. See HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY. THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35-65 (1996)
(arguing that the application of the exclusionary rule frequently leads to illogical results
and presents a barrier to justice grounded in technicalities). See generally PHILIP K. HowAIn, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw Is SUFFOCATING AMERICA 11 (1994) (examining our modern legal system and noting that "[iun the decades since World War II, we
have constructed a system of regulatory law that basically outlaws common sense").
4. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996) (criticizing the "procedural republic" as a form of political philosophy which "asserts the priority of fair procedures over partiular ends").
5. See Douglas L. Colbert, Section Endorses Appointed Counsel at Bail Hearing,A.B.A. SEC.
CRIM. JUST., Summer 1998, at 17, 17 (recounting the case ofJohn Holzan, who had "been
in jail 27 days since his arrest on a misdemeanor charge of driving with a suspended license" before finally being released on personal recognizance).
6. See id. at 18 (noting that "[i]n Maryland .. . more than one-half of the 195,000
criminal cases prosecuted in the lower criminal court during fiscal year 1997 ultimately
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cases raise important questions about a failed legal revolution.7 For
when the charges have been dismissed, what will Colbert's defendants
understand about "criminal procedure"? The majesty of Gideon? The
wisdom of the Warren Court? No doubt, the jailed and abandoned
defendant would agree with critics of criminal procedure. How else
could he see the "process" except as his punishment?
Few in America would approve of "punishment-by-process"-the
stock in trade of repressive regimes.' And that, in one way, is my
point. Rules of criminal procedure have become suspect, both in the
scholarly and the popular imagination, because people view them as
"special" rights, the stuff ofjudicial technicality and obfuscation, leading only to the protection of the worst among us. But this popular
conception fails to recognize that there are important links, as punishment-by-process suggests, between criminal procedure and our democratic form of government. In what follows, I argue that the Sixth
Amendment' vision of Gideon may be quite different from the one
traditionally portrayed as linking the right to counsel to the right to a
lawyer's assistance at trial. Under this vision, the right to counsel does
not serve to protect guilty defendants but to ensure equality and democracy for the rest of us. The lawyer is the individual's guarantor of
a "right of opposition," 10 and, as such, is essential to a process of democratization, a process in which all interests (even the government's) are subject to competition.1

concluded without conviction" and "about 1,500 pretrial detainees are in custody because
they could not afford to pay a 10 percent bail of $500 or less").
7. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at
Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (finding a "widespread failure to recognize the
right to counsel" when a defendant first "appear[s] for bail before a judicial officer" and
that "nonassignment of counsel at the initial appearance is commonplace throughout the
nation").
8. See, e.g., Heinz J. Klug, Note, The South African Judicial Order and the Future: A Comparative Analysis of the South African Judicial System and Judicial Transitions in Zimbabwe,
Mozambique, and Nicaragua, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 173, 211 (1988) (describing

a practice in pre-Mandela South Africa whereby people, often innocent, were arrested and
"made to endure a... period of punishment by process") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crewe, Punishment by Process,SASH, May 1987, at 19-20). The author wishes
to thank her colleague Heinz Klug for bringing this to her attention.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
10. Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY 195, 233 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) ("The legally guaranteed

right of opposition is. . . a fundamental norm of democratic government; it provides an
essential precondition for the formation of a democratic public opinion.")
11. See Adam Przeworski, Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts, in CONSTrruTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 59, 63 (describing the passage from an au-
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Lest this seem an academic proposition, recent events warn of the
importance of the right to counsel to the democratic ideal. While the
national press has fallen over itself to publicize the latest Miranda ruling, 1 2 the most important criminal procedure development of the
decade occurred elsewhere. You can be rich, white, or even a friend
of the president"3 and still be whisked away by the police, friendless
and without counsel. Gideon's trumpet remains muted. In part, this is
because we have forgotten that criminal procedure is for all of us, not
just some. We have forgotten that we control the government not to
subvert public ends or to inhibit crime control, but to prevent the
government from using power to prefer itself and its needs over those
of its citizens.
I.

SELF-REFERENTIALISM AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

To the average man on the street, there is no doubt something
odd, something decidedly odd, about the ways in which lawyers talk
about the right to counsel. It is hornbook law, for example, that the
Sixth Amendment applies when "adversarial proceedings" have begun.1 4 It is also hornbook law that counsel will not be provided until a
"critical stage" in the proceedings. 5 Ask the average person whether,
when she is thrown in jail, it is an adversarial proceeding, and she will
say, "Of course it's adversarial." Ask her whether she needs a lawyer
and she'll say, "Of course it's critical." And, yet, conventional legal
wisdom about the Sixth Amendment runs to the contrary: the average
lay person's idea is not the law of adversarial proceedings or critical
stages in the United States. 16
thoritarian system to a democratic one as a "process of subjecting all interests to
competition, of institutionalizing uncertainty").
12. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 690-91 (4th Cir.) (holding that federal
courts are not required to suppress Miranda-defective voluntary confessions), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 578 (1999); Brooke A. Masters & Tom Jackman, Justice System Worries About 'Miranda,'WASH. Posr., Feb. 16, 1999, at B1 (discussing the controversy sparked by Miranda
and reaction to the Fourth Circuit's Dickerson ruling).
13. The author is referring to Monica Lewinsky, whose affair with the President was the
basis for an independent counsel investigation and subsequent impeachment of the
President.
14. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion) ("[A) person's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.").
15. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) ("In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.").
16. See Colbert, supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that an accused's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel should extend to her initial bail proceeding and noting that "[m]ost people are
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My point is not that lawyers have lost their common sense or that
lawyerly language is obscuring, but that these terms may be as illuminating for what they do not mean as for what they do. We all know the
doctrinal reasons why, to the Sixth Amendment expert, adversarial
doesn't really mean adversarial and critical doesn't really mean critical-adversarial or critical to the defendant, that is. 17 Indeed, because
the doctrine has venerable origins and apparently wise purposes, we
tend to forget that, for all our fine words and complex constitutional
doctrine, the criminal procedure of the Sixth Amendment, and sometimes the Fifth, does very little to ensure a long and mutually supportive lawyer-client relationship. It neither requires the appointment of
lawyers at the earliest stage of proceedings nor demands that the
states provide enough lawyers or that the lawyers provided have sufficient time to provide a competent defense. The doctrine has developed largely as a means to exclude tainted evidence and regulate
police deception.' 8 Put another way, it serves to ensure the reliability
of the system (writ large) rather than to protect the individual
defendant.
In a sense, we might have expected a chasm between the common
sense of counsel and the law of counsel. Elsewhere, I have argued that
much modern constitutional law doctrine has a peculiar flavor of selfreferentialism, a way of turning questions about the world into questions about the court.1 9 Whether it involves fundamental rights, expectations of privacy, or even habeas corpus, the Court too often talks
skeptical when told that individuals are unrepresented when first appearing for a judicial
bail determination").
17. The Supreme Court, in its Sixth Amendment evidentiary exclusion cases, has
clearly held that "adversary proceedings" means the beginning of "judicial" proceedings:
"Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-'whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion)); see also
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that the Constitution is
violated when adversary judicial proceedings have commenced against an individual and,
in the absence of counsel, government agents engage in deliberate elicitation of incriminating information). The right to a defense against a criminal "prosecution," as provided
in the Constitution, is thus defined in terms of "judicial" involvement in that prosecution.
18. See, e.g.,JOsHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.02, at 437 (2d
ed. 1997) (examining the Massiah rule and noting that some commentators have determined the underlying issue to be the scope of deceit allowable in governmental undercover work).
19. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Making ConstitutionalDoctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. PA.
L. REv. 1401, 1404-05 (1997) (asserting that the evolution of modem constitutional doctrine reflects "institutional self-doubt.., about the job of judging [and] the possibility of
doctrinal failure").
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about its own institutional problems rather than the problems of the
people it serves, leaving us in a cycle of ongoing arguments that appear
to be about us, about the people and their problems, but are really
about something else-the court's quest for legitimacy, its concern
about its place relative to other institutions, and its reputation among
court-watchers. In a certain sense, this institutionalizing of justice is
inevitable in a complex world; all constitutional questions are, as my
colleague Neil Komesar has argued, about institutional choice.2" But
if that choice is made unthinkingly, if it is made with the idea that only
the judiciary's interests are at stake (as opposed to those of the market, of society, or politics), it risks at best diversion and at worst the
creation of a constitution for the judges, not the people.
The right to counsel is simply another example of this phenomenon. Indeed, we can see it in the evolution of some of the great opinions on the topic." Powell v. Alabama2 2 seems, today, an opinion of
great courage. It tells us, for example, about the "fundamental character" of the right to a lawyer and its universality as a principle of
constitutional law.23 But these statements, even when they are at their
most eloquent, seem as much about the judiciary as about the Scottsboro defendants. After all, the Court in Powellused the right to counsel to avoid the real question: the question of race-the question of
how and whether a state could convict someone when it was committed to seeing them guilty-by-race. Powell did not hold that racism
could taint a trial. Instead, it turned racism into a failure of process:
the Court reached out to the right to counsel, transforming the
"wrong" of racism into the judge's failure to appoint a lawyer. Indeed,
even at its most eloquent, the Court seems to place judicial interests
ahead of the defendants': for example, in a rather dramatic statement, the Court states that a capital trial without counsel would
amount to 'judicial murder" 2 4-the image of a license to kill is power20. See

NEIL

K.

KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES"

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

(1994).
21. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (criticizing Bets v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), for failing to recognize that "appointment of counsel for an indigent
criminal defendant is 'a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial'" (quoting Bets, 316 U.S.
at 471)).
22. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that the state trial court had a duty to assign counsel for an indigent and illiterate defendant in a capital case, thus paving the way for
Gideon).
23. Id. at 68 ("[I]t [is] clear that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental
character.")
24. Id. at 72. Specifically, the Court states:
Let us suppose the extreme case of a prisoner charged with a capital offense,
who is deaf and dumb, illiterate and feeble minded, unable to employ counsel,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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ful but noteworthy, as well, for the Court's emphasis on the danger to
it rather than to the defendants.
Every constitutional lawyer knows the reasons why Powell linked
the Scottsboro defendants' right to a lawyer to the right to a fair trial.
To overturn the convictions required a violation of "due process"
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 But this necessarily limited the
scope of Powell's protection. The embrace of "due process" and the
invocation of a long list of circumstances demanding the defendants'
representation ended up restricting the scope of the Court's "right to
counsel." Thus, despite all the ringing phrases in Powell about the
fundamental and universal nature of the right to counsel, it remained
the case, after Powell that the states could refuse to appoint counsel.
For years after Powel4 the "fundamental" nature of the right was
largely rhetorical. The right to counsel remained a rather porous protection, dependent upon the specific facts and circumstances of individual cases.26
Modern era cases have reenacted this drama-giving with one
hand what is taken back by another-in a variety of contexts. For example, in United States v. Wade,2 7 the Supreme Court expanded the
right to counsel to require the presence of lawyers at lineups. 28 However, in expanding the right, the court also laid the foundation for
limiting it. It justified its requirement that lawyers be present at lineups on the ground that the lineup was a "critical stage" of the proceeding. 29 In distinguishing other investigative techniques, the court
laid the groundwork for the analysis that tells states today that they
need not provide counsel at bail hearings. Only "critical stages"those stages that "might derogate from [the defendant's] right to a
fair trial" 3°-demand counsel after Wade. The fair trial link thus bewith the whole power of the state arrayed against him, prosecuted by counsel for
the state without assignment of counsel for his defense, tried, convicted and sentenced to death. Such a result, which, if carried into execution, would be little
short of judicial murder, it cannot be doubted would be a gross violation of the

guarantee of due process of law; and we venture to think that no appellate court,
state or federal, would hesitate so to decide.
Id.
25. See id. at 71 (holding that a failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was

denial of due process).
26. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), for example, the Court "refused to accept the
contention that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defend-

ants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, made 'obligatory upon the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465).
27. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
28. Id. at 224-27.
29. Id. at 237.
30. Id. at 226-27.
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comes the measure or limit on the right to counsel rather than a reason for the right to counsel.
Wade's rhetoric is powerful: in almost magisterial terms, the
Supreme Court tells us that "the accused ... need not stand alone

against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal,
in court or out."3 1 Soon, of course, it was quite clear that the Court

did not really mean that the accused "need not stand alone." Wade
was later limited by Kirby3 and Ash,33 which emphasized the need for
a "critical" stage only after "adversarial proceedings" had begun. Thus
has the alleged "purpose" of the right to counsel, doctrinalized, come
to be the means of limiting the "right to counsel," the way in which
Powell and Wade and Gideon makes it possible that states may still refuse to provide counsel in the kinds of cases that Doug Colbert has
catalogued. 4
Justice Black understood this and made it quite clear in his opinion in Wade, where he emphasized the risks of the "critical stages"
inquiry. He specifically warned that a "fair trial" might lie in the eye
of the beholder and thus "might derogate from . . . [a defendant's]
right" to counsel.3" That, as he put it elsewhere, the fair trial link
would make the right to counsel a "second-class" right.3 6 As he explained in Wade:.

31. Id.
32. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to police conduct occurring prior to
"the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings").
33. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973) (holding that a photographic display, even if conducted post-indictment, is not a critical stage of the proceedings and therefore does not trigger the right to counsel).
34. A similar dance appears in Argersingerv. Hamlin,407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (expanding
Gideon to encompass misdemeanor cases: "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial") and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1979) (limiting Argersingeds right to counsel in misdemeanor cases based on its
"imprisonment" rationale: "[N]o indigent criminal defendant [shall] be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense").
35. Wade, 388 U.S. at 247 (Black, J.,dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 228).
36. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 278-79 (1967) (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). He states:
[T] here is nothing in the Constitution to justify considering the right to counsel
as a second-class, subsidiary right which attaches only when the Court deems
other specific rights in jeopardy. The real basis for the Court's holding that the
stage of obtaining handwriting exemplars is not "critical," is its statement that
"there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from his right
to a fair trial." The Court considers the "right to a fair trial" to be the overriding
"aim of the right to counsel," and somehow believes that this Court has the power
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[T]here are implications in the Court's opinion that by a
"fair trial" the Court means a trial which a majority of this Court
deems to be 'fair"and that a lineup is a "criticalstage" only because
the Court, now assessingthe "innumerabledangers" which inhere in
it, thinks it is such....

[I]t is clear from the Court's opinion

in Gilbert v. California that it is willing to make the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel dependent on
the Court's own view of whether a particular stage of the proceedings-though "critical" in the sense of the prosecution's
gathering of evidence-is "critical" to the Court's own view
of a "fair trial." I am wholly unwilling to make the specific
constitutional right of counsel dependent on judges' vague
and transitory notions of fairness and their equally transitory,
though thought to be empirical, assessment of the "risk that
...counsel's absence ... might derogate from... [a defend-

ant's] right to a fair trial.""7

To Justice Black, the critical stage analysis meant that the Court
was balancing away the principles for which Gideon stood,3" and using
"words like a 'fair trial' to take the place of the clearly specified safeguards of the Constitution." 9
Interestingly enough, modern commentary has paid very little
heed to Justice Black's concerns. The conventional wisdom typically
celebrates the link to trials. It was widely believed, for example, that
exclusionary rule cases, like Mapp,40 would have difficulty achieving
their goal-deterring illegal searches and seizures-precisely because
"they addressed problems beyond the direct control of the courts."4"
By contrast, the right to counsel decisions were haled as fully realizable precisely because they dealt with "matters within the immediate
to balance away the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel when the Court
believes it unnecessary to provide what the Court considers a "fair trial."
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Wade, 388 U.S. at 246-47 (Black, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Wade,388 U.S. at 228).
38. He explained:
The Framers did not declare in the Sixth Amendment that a defendant is entitled
to a "fair trial," nor that he is entitled to counsel on the condition that this Court
thinks there is more than a "minimal risk" that without a lawyer his trial will be
"unfair." The Sixth Amendment settled that a trial without a lawyer is constitutionally unfair, unless the court-created balancing formula has somehow changed
it.

Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id.
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
41. JEROLD ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SUPREME COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 251 (1997).

LEADING
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and continuing control of the courts."4 2 Thus,"even if sheriffs and
police officers refused to carry out Mapp v. Ohio, trial judges and prosecutors presumably could be "entrusted" to follow the dictates of
Gideon and appoint counsel at appropriate times and places.
This view has had a strong influence on the theory of the right to
counsel. Indeed, conventional explanations emphasize the right to
counsel as essential to a "fair judicial process" rather than the protection of individuals from State coercion. 4 ' A leading casebook, for example, urges that the right to counsel serves to protect the reliability
of the "guilt-determining" process while individual liberty is protected
by the exclusionary rule." Now, this is a very interesting state of affairs. The claim is being made that protections of items seized, for the
most part, stand as the great protection of liberty while the right to
counsel protects the "process." I suspect that if you asked the average
person on the street, they might find that this was a bit backwardsthat they would far rather have access to a good attorney when sent to
jail than bet on the not-so-often exclusion of evidence at trial. Indeed,
I expect that those who might be politically unpopular or social outcasts might care a good deal more about consulting an attorney than
about the introduction of evidence. Ask the Scottsboro defendants,
were they alive, and I am sure that they would have wanted counsel,
notjust because of how that lawyer would perform at trial, but because
he might have been their only way to communicate that they had
been railroaded, targeted for their race, not their offense.
It is not surprising, given this understanding, that many of the
great cases about the "right to counsel" have avoided rather simple
and, yet presumably important, questions about precisely when a defendant should have meaningful access to a lawyer; instead, these
cases have focused on the exclusion of evidence at trial. Miranda,45
Massiah,46 Escobedo,47 and Brewer" all revolve, in one way or another,

42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 35, 59 (1991) ("[Tlhe right to counsel significantly advances
'fair process' and 'dignitary' norms that serve to legitimate the operation of the criminal
justice system.").
44. ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 41, at 251.
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966) (holding that an individual held
for interrogation must be informed of his right to have counsel present and his privilege
against self-incrimination).
46. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (stating that the defendant's
self-incriminating statements, obtained after his indictment and without benefit of counsel,
could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial").
47. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (holding that "when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is
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around the right to counsel; none, however, tells you precisely when
that right attaches or what it looks like. Escobedo told us that the right
attached very early in the process but, in a post-Mirandaworld, that
has been taken back.4 9 Miranda,of course, offers a right to appointed
counsel, or at least advice on that question, to protect the defendant's
right against self-incrimination, but advice about counsel does not
mean that counsel is actually provided or access assured.
In part this is because of a trend in which the Sixth Amendment
is typically litigated, and considered by the Supreme Court, as a question of evidentiary exclusion. The question of when "adversarial proceedings" have begun, for example, is taught to students, as a general
matter, through Supreme Court cases involving the use of particular
kinds of evidence at trial. Indeed, some of the most difficult cases
involve questions about when the police may "deliberately elicit" confessions, wiretap confederates, or place informants in a defendant's
jail cell.50 Surely, these are important issues, issues that ask us to determine when and how a government may investigate its citizens, but
they have almost nothing to do with the aid that a lawyer might give to
a client or the client's need for the lawyer. At most, they are about the
ways in which police and prosecutors may interfere with the still-yet-undefined right to counsel.

to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer").
48. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399, 405-06 (1977) (holding, based on the circumstances of the case, that police violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel by eliciting incriminating information from him after the initiation ofjudicial proceedings and without notice to his counsel).
49. Escobedo applied the Sixth Amendment to a pre-indictment interrogation-a case in
which a defendant repeatedly asked for his lawyer and the lawyer, although in the station
house, was denied access. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479-81. Later, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972), the Supreme Court would "take back" Escobedo as a Sixth Amendment case and
reconstrue it as a case that "like Miranda," was essential to "guarantee ... the privilege
against self-incrimination" under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 689 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966)).
50. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (stating that when "police and
their informant [take] some action ... that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks," defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated); United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that self-incriminating statements made by an accused,
while under indictment, when police "intentionally creat[e] a situation likely to induce
[the accused] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel," is a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 (holding
"that the petitioner was denied the basic protections [of the Sixth Amendment] when
there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which
federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel").
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It is not surprising, in a world in which evidentiary exclusion was
the remedial focus, that courts' institutional concerns would come to
the fore. But it should be. For this focus has led to outcomes and
emphases that, I think, from the average lay person's perspective
could only seem decidedly odd. For example, although the Court has
developed a complex set of rules and regulations governing when evidence will be excluded as a violation of the Sixth Amendment, it has
sometimes refused to protect the lawyer/client relationship as such.
Ask a defendant whether he would find more protection from a rule
that limited post-indictment investigatory efforts of police or if the police were required to inform him that a lawyer was offering his services, and no doubt you will hear answers directly contrary to those
given by the Supreme Court.51
If the principal purpose of criminal procedure were to protect
courts, then this upside-down world would make perfect sense. It
would make perfect sense to start the right to counsel at judicial proceedings rather than when the defendant sits in jail; it would make
perfect sense to worry more about evidentiary exclusions than about
whether lawyers really assisted clients; it would make perfect sense to
believe that the right to counsel depends upon critical stages of the
proceedings rather than the risk of imprisoning the innocent or unpopular. But that is not what most lawyers or most people think: they
think, rightly, that lawyers are their allies and advocates. They think,
as the Scottsboro defendants might have, that their lawyer is their only
chance at equal justice; that he was their government.
II.

THE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND LIMITED GOVERNMENT

At the beginning of this essay, I urged that criminal procedure is
not simply procedure for procedure's sake but a protection of democratic political structure. That sounds a bit fancy, but the history is
quite down to earth and, indeed, represents (I believe) a rather old
tradition in the field of criminal procedure and one with important
implications today.
The notion that criminal procedure is the criminal law of the police has a very old pedigree and has important implications for modern criminal procedure. In his stunning and prescient dissent in
Olmstead v. United States,5 2 Justice Brandeis wrote:
51. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1986) (holding that even deliberate
deception of an attorney by the police does not change application of Miranda waiver
rules).
52. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.... Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.5"
Worn out by overuse, perhaps, this passage nevertheless is worthy
of substantial scrutiny for, in it, Brandeis offers us a political-and I
would argue substantive-theory of criminal procedure. For Brandeis
is not, as is commonly understood, seeking merely to limit the exercise of will by police, nor to elaborate upon the expressive purposes of
law. He is linking criminal procedure and constitutional structure. It
is the very "existence of the government" 4 that Brandeis claims is at
stake. Indeed, he later predicts "terrible retribution"5 5 if the government may break the law in the name of enforcing it. To some, no
doubt, this may seem hyperbole-surely the proverbial constable's
blundering cannot bring down a government. Left unarticulated, yet
implicit, is Brandeis's assumption that a government that breaks laws
becomes better than its citizens; that it betrays the fundamental tenet of
democratic self-government according to which the government is the
agent, rather than the master, of the people. After all, what is the
definition of an authoritarian regime but the bending of established
procedures for the sake of a political or wealthy elite.5 6 Brandeis's
prediction that the very "existence of the government" 57 was at stake
was no exaggeration; it was a statement of political faith in a democracy's dependence upon the idea of a government as the servant of its
citizens.
This message of equality has played an important role in the history of criminal procedure, particularly when it comes to the question
of race. Long before the Warren court's decisions, the Supreme
Court sensed the dangers of a government that used its police machinery selectively against some citizens. As early as Powell v. Ala53. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Przeworski, supra note 11, at 60 (arguing that the "essential feature of [authoritarian] regimes is that someone [or some group] has an effective capacity to prevent political outcomes that would be highly adverse to their interests" and that "the power
apparatus in an authoritarian system exercises not only procedures but also substantive
control over decisions").
57. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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bama,5 8 police sanctioned racism was conceived, 'by the Court, as a
failure of procedure.5 9 This would come to be a strategy followed
closely by Earl Warren.6 ° Rightly, Warren was worried that the State
was using the criminal justice system to demoralize, disenfranchise,
and otherwise demean blacks, reenacting in more civilized garb a terrible history of state-approved coercion and violence we now know as
slavery's legacy.61
Warren's revolution aimed to increase the transaction costs of racism and thus to deter the use of the police as a tool of the southern
white aristocracy. Rather than attempting to single out racism by
looking for bad racial motives, Warren, in a move characteristic of the
politician, attempted to link the rights of the minority to the rights of
all-not pitting blacks and whites against each other or viewing racism
as a tortious wrong, but demanding that all be subject to the same
procedures. By increasing the costs of policing and prosecution, and
by empowering their institutional competitors (lawyers), the hope was
that the costs, and visibility, of racism would also increase. But, of
course, the political price of this (its generalization) was also its undoing: across-the-board procedures also increase the cost of crime control generally. It was not surprising, then, that political support for
this attempt to shift the costs of racism to the majority would come
under attack as soon as the public perceived the costs of crime to outweigh the costs of racism. Nor, in some sense, should it be surprising
that the Court's own enthusiasm for this approach would wane. For
once the institution's reputational benefits no longer appeared tied to
saving the poor and downtrodden (and secretly fighting racism), its
58. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Powell was not the only early case
involving egregious use of the criminal justice system against African Americans. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 227-35 (1940) (involving the confessions of four Blacks
who were interrogated continuously for a week with the last session lasting all night before
confessions were signed); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936) (involving confessions which were "extorted by officers of the State [using] brutality and violence").
60. See Gary Peller, CriminalLaw, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcendingthe Critical
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2231, 2245 (1993) ("As Charles Ogletree has suggested,
much of the Warren Court's 'criminal procedure' reform more properly should be understood as constituting a branch of race law." (citing Charles Ogletree, Lecture at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 1990))); see also WilliamJ. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between CriminalProcedure and CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997)
("The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the
sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white
ones.").
61. See Nourse, supra note 19, at 1440 & n.177 (noting that disenfranchisement has
often been linked to crime in the history of the oppression of African Americans). Indeed,
in discussing criminal procedure, it is all too often forgotten that felons are, by law, often
prevented from voting.
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own institutional costs (of generating a complex set of cases creating a
constitutional tort law for police and administering it under a controversial exclusionary rule) became quite clear. In the face of these two
developments, the Court's criminal procedure decisions have satisfied
few, on left or right, with the exception, I suspect, of the Court itself.
For decades, academics have assumed that the courts are essential
to the protection of criminal procedure rights. If I am right about the
dangers of institutional sef-referentialism, it should not be surprising,
in the end, to see that courts are subject to constraints too, just as are
political institutions. But if this is true, then the new criminal procedure will have to be a debate that is far more sensitive to the virtues
and vices of institutional choice. It may well be, for example, that in
some cases the balance is best struck outside the courts, in local communities or in administrative agencies.6 2 Indeed, it may be that we
need to think of new ways-other than procedure itself-to link the
interests of defendants and police, by turning to substantive law,6" for
example, or by looking at the protections offered by constitutional
provisions other than those typically employed.' At the same time, it
is also true that "reformers" cannot forget the role that criminal procedure does, and should continue to play, in barring the use of state
violence to enforce social norms of inequality and superiority.
62. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguing for a new system of criminal procedure
more responsive to communities' needs).
63. Linking the rights of the potential defendant to the rules governing allmembers of
society provides a natural resistance to the claim that the defendant's rights are simply
"special" rules for criminals. For example, the earliest English criminal procedure decisions used trespass rules to restrict the government's use of the search and seizure power.
See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-99
(1995) (describing this history of the Fourth Amendment). Today, however, this idea of
linking state law to criminal procedure has been lost. A state may violate state or federal
law in conducting a search and, yet, conduct a "reasonable" search under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452-55 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the notion that the legality of a search under federal (air traffic) rules was
relevant to Fourth Amendment determination). For a different, and important, argument
about the relationship of state substantive criminal law and criminal procedure, see Stuntz,
supra note 60, at 6 ("Constitutionalizing procedure, in a world where substantive law and
funding are the province of legislatures, may tend to encourage bad substantive law and
underfunding. But constitutionalizing some aspects of substantive criminal law and defense funding would not tend to encourage bad procedure, or bad anything else.").
64. For example, the Takings Clause has been ignored by traditional criminal procedure literature. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."). When the State wrongfully imprisons or holds its citizens, it seems far from a stretch to argue that the citizen's time and labor (and thus his
"property") has been "taken" without "due compensation." See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 331-34 (1985) (advocating an
expansive view of the concept of property).
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If any of this is correct, the right to counsel should not be understood simply as procedure for procedure's sake. Nor is the right to
counsel to be preferred simply to achieve fairer or even more accurate
trials. The importance of the lawyer in these circumstances is not
someone to try a case (most cases are never tried), but someone to
stand with the individual citizen unaligned to the forces that laid him
low and resist claims of the natural and inevitable superiority of government. Can a citizen, stowed away in jail, believe that he is "equal"
before the law, when he cannot prove that the authorities are
wrong?6" When the law is the citizen's enemy, and procedure his punishment, his government is by definition above him, propped up by
authority, not consent.
The right to counsel is at least as much about controlling politics
fair trials, as much about reducing the influence of social
about
as
norms of inequality on governments as about critical stages in judicial
procedure. Justice Black knew this. And he wrote it, in Gideon. While
much of the opinion is spent interring earlier precedent, near the end
Black expands upon his theory of the right to counsel. He tells us first
that it is simply "obvious" that "any person haled into court, who is too
66
poor to hire a lawyer," cannot be assured a "fair" trial. But why is
this so? Black's immediate answer is not about the aid that a lawyer
may provide at trial. He tells us that "[g] overnments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime."67 Not surprisingly, from here,
Black appeals to democracy. He tells us that "[t]he right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."68 From the
very creation of our constitution, Justice Black tells us, the states and
the nation have each sought to ensure that "every defendant stands
equal before the law."6 9
65. By emphasizing the role of equality, I am not urging that the law of criminal procedure should aim to put the defendant and the government on an "even-playing field." No
rule of criminal procedure can do that. Nor am I suggesting that rules of criminal procedure can equalize wealth or eliminate racism. Again, no rule of criminal procedure, alone,
can achieve those ends. Rules of criminal procedure, however, may provide the means by
which the citizen can subject the government's interest "to competition," to test its claims
for consistency and to alert us to cases in which the government's power is being used to
protect government itself or protect some citizens against others (largely by incorporating
social norms of inequality into law).
66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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Gideon is not about procedure for procedure's sake, adversarial
proceedings or even critical stages. Gideon is about the ultimate
agency problem in a republic-governing the governors so that the
people govern themselves. May we continue in that understanding of
Gideon a short thirty-five years after its decision, for through it, we may
remember the wisdom and importance of the right to counsel.

